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Abstract 
Using perfectly competitive, general equilibrium models of international trade, specific import 
tariffs, specific export taxes, and ad valorem trade taxes are compared in a trade war. A trade 
war is modelled as a NE in trade policies, where each country can choose to use ad valorem 
trade taxes (import tariffs or export taxes, which are equivalent), or specific import tariffs, or 
specific export taxes. In the two-country case, where there is a negative terms of trade 
externality a specific export tax dominates a specific import tariff or ad valorem trade taxes. 
Hence, the Lerner Symmetry Theorem does not hold for specific trade taxes in a trade war. 
This result continues to hold when the model is extended to the case of many countries 
assuming that there is a negative terms of trade externality. In a trade policy game where two 
countries export the same good so there is a positive terms of trade externality in the trade 
policy game between these two countries, the results are reversed with a specific import tariff 
dominating a specific export tax or ad valorem trade taxes. Hence, again the Lerner Symmetry 
Theorem does not hold for specific trade taxes in a trade war. 
 
JEL Classifications: F11; F13; C72; D51; H21 
Keywords: Ad Valorem Trade Tax; Specific Trade Tax; Perfect Competition; General 
Equilibrium; NE in Trade Taxes; Lerner Symmetry Theorem. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent events such as the US-China trade conflict have made the analysis of trade wars 
a topical issue in international trade policy rather than just a theoretical curiosity that has 
interested economists for more than a century. In a perfectly-competitive, general equilibrium 
model with two countries, although free trade is Pareto-efficient for the global economy, it is 
well known that a large country with monopoly/monopsony power can improve its terms of 
trade and maximise its welfare by using an optimum trade tax. The Lerner (1936) Symmetry 
Theorem, which shows that an ad valorem import tariff is equivalent to an ad valorem export 
tax, implies that the optimum trade tax may be either an import tariff or an export tax.1 Hence, 
the outcome in terms of the level of the optimum trade tax and in terms of the welfare of the 
country is the same whether the country uses an ad valorem import tariff or an ad valorem 
export tax.2 Since the optimum trade tax is a beggar-my-neighbour policy as it worsens the 
terms of trade of the other country, it is likely that the other country will retaliate if a country 
pursues such a policy. The possibility of retaliation was first analysed by Johnson (1953) who 
modelled the resulting trade war as a Nash equilibrium (NE) in trade taxes and showed that, 
although it seems most likely that both countries will lose in a trade war, it was possible for 
one country to win the trade war if it had sufficient monopoly/monopsony power.3 Again, the 
outcome in terms of the level of NE trade taxes and in terms of the NE welfare of the two 
countries is the same whether the countries use ad valorem import tariffs or ad valorem export 
 
1 For a modern treatment of the Lerner Symmetry Theorem, see Costinot and Werning (2019), who 
extend the theorem in a number of ways such as allowing for imperfect competition. 
2 The optimum import tariff rate will be equal to the optimum export tax rate if the import tariff is 
expressed as a proportion of the world price of the importable good and the export tax is expressed as a proportion 
of the domestic price of the exportable good. 
3 In a pure exchange economy, Kennan and Riezman (1988) showed that if a country was sufficiently 
large then it would win a trade war and this result was generalised by Syropoulos (2002). 
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taxes. Hence, the Lerner Symmetry Theorem clearly holds for ad valorem trade taxes in trade 
wars. 
Although countries predominantly use ad valorem trade taxes, they do use specific (per-
unit) trade taxes as well as other trade policies such as import quotas or export quotas.4 Under 
perfect competition, ad valorem and specific taxes are generally regarded as equivalent and the 
same is true of trade taxes when a country unilaterally sets its trade tax. However, Horwell 
(1966) and Lockwood and Wong (2000) have shown that specific import tariffs are not 
equivalent to ad valorem import tariffs in trade wars. If the home country shifts from using a 
specific import tariff to using an ad valorem import tariff, then its offer curve will become more 
elastic and the foreign country will set a lower import tariff. Since the foreign country setting 
a lower import tariff will increase the welfare of the home country, choosing to use an ad 
valorem import tariff will dominate choosing to use a specific import tariff for the home 
country. Hence, since the same reasoning holds for the foreign country, both countries will 
choose to use ad valorem import tariffs and, in the symmetric case, both countries will have 
lower tariffs and higher welfare than when they both choose to use specific import tariffs. 
This raises the question of how a specific export tax compares with an ad valorem 
export tax and whether the Lerner Symmetry Theorem holds for specific trade taxes. The 
approach used to answer this question will be similar to that used by Vives (1985) to compare 
the Cournot equilibrium (where the strategic variable is output) with the Bertrand equilibrium 
(where the strategic variable is price) in a differentiated product oligopoly model. He analysed 
the Cournot oligopolists as maximising profits by choosing their price subject to a constraint 
given by the demand function, and then comparing the prices set by the Cournot oligopolists 
with those set by the Bertrand oligopolists. Here, countries choosing to use specific trade taxes 
 
4 The use of quotas in a trade war has been analysed by Rodriguez (1974) and Tower (1975) who both 
show that trade will approach zero in a trade war. 
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will be analysed as maximising their welfare by choosing ad valorem trade taxes subject to a 
constraint that ensures the equivalence of the ad valorem and specific trade taxes. Then, the 
best-reply functions with specific trade taxes can easily be compared with the best-reply 
functions with ad valorem trade taxes. The advantage of this method is that it can be carried 
out in a general setting as in Dixit (1987) with the only significant assumption being about the 
sign of the terms of trade externality, which allows general results to be obtained and highlights 
the importance of the sign of the terms of trade externality for the results obtained.5 
Section two considers a two-country trade policy game with a negative terms of trade 
externality, and it is shown that for both countries choosing to use specific export taxes 
dominates choosing to use ad valorem trade taxes or specific import tariffs. In the symmetric 
case, both countries set lower trade taxes and have higher welfare when they choose to use 
specific export taxes rather than ad valorem trade taxes or specific import tariffs. Hence, the 
Lerner Symmetry Theorem does not hold for specific trade taxes in trade wars. Section three 
extends the results to the many country case by assuming symmetry and keeps the assumption 
of a negative terms of trade externality. Section four considers a trade policy game between 
two countries that both export the same good in a many-country world, which implies that there 
is a positive terms of trade externality. In this case, it is shown that the results are reversed with 
countries choosing to use specific import tariffs dominating choosing to use ad valorem trade 
taxes or specific export taxes. Again, the Lerner Symmetry Theorem does not hold for specific 
trade taxes in a trade war. Section five presents some conclusions. 
 
5 According to Bagwell and Staiger (2016) the terms of trade externality has a critical role in the analysis 
of trade agreements. 
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2. Two-Country Trade Policy Game 
Consider a conventional two-country trade policy game such as that analysed by 
Johnson (1953) and Dixit (1987) where there is a strategic interaction between the two 
countries due to the negative terms of trade externality. In this perfectly competitive, general 
equilibrium model, there are two large countries, labelled 1 and 2, and two goods, labelled 1 
and 2, where country one exports good one and imports good two while country two exports 
good two and imports good one. Hence, the terms of trade for country one are: 1 1 2p p  , and 
for country two are: 2 2 1p p  , where 1p  and 2p  are the world prices of goods one and two, 
respectively. Obviously, the terms of trade of country one are the reciprocal of the terms of 
trade of country two, 1 1 2 21p p   . For each country, an improvement (increase) in the 
terms of trade increases the relative price of its exports or, equivalently, decreases the relative 
price of its imports. 
Since the countries are large, they can use trade policy to affect their terms of trade and 
welfare, and each country has two trade policy decisions to make in this model. First, each 
country has to choose whether to use an ad valorem trade tax, which can be either an import 
tariff or an export tax, and is denoted by jT  ; a specific import tariff, which is denoted by tjT ; 
or a specific export tax, which is denoted by ejT , where 1,2j   denotes the country. Then, 
each country, 1, 2j  , has to decide the rate for the chosen type of trade tax with the ad valorem 
trade tax rate denoted by j , the specific import tariff rate denoted by jt , and the specific 
export tax rate denoted by je . In this general equilibrium model, specific trade taxes are 
expressed in terms of the untaxed good (the export good in the case of import tariffs and the 
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import good in the case of export taxes).6 As usual, it is assumed that the trade tax revenue of 
each country is remitted to the consumers of that country in a lump-sum manner, which 
prevents the occurrence of the Lerner (1936) paradox. 
The domestic prices of goods one and two, respectively, are 11p  and 21p  in country 
one, and 12p  and 22p  in country two. Hence, the relative, domestic price of the importable 
good in the two countries in terms of their import tariffs (in the numerator) and export taxes (in 
the denominator) and world prices are: 
   
 
 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 221 1211 1 1 1 2 22 2 2 2 1
1 1
1 1
p t p p t pp p
p p e p p p e p
 
 
         (1) 
The first point to note from (1) is that if the specific taxes are equal to zero, 
1 1 2 2 0t e t e     then it is clear that an ad valorem import tariff has exactly the same effect 
on the relative domestic price of the importable good as an ad valorem export tax at the same 
rate, and it can be shown that it raises exactly the same trade tax revenue in real terms. Hence, 
the equilibrium with an ad valorem import tariff is exactly the same as that with an ad valorem 
export tax at the same rate, which is the Lerner Symmetry Theorem. What is less clear is that 
if the ad valorem trade taxes are equal to zero, 1 2 0   , then a specific import tariff 1t  is 
equivalent to an export tax  2 21 1 1 2 1 1 2e t p p t p p   or  21 1 1 1 1 1e t t    since they both have 
the same effect on the relative domestic price of the importable good in country one and both 
raise the same trade tax revenue in real terms. Hence, although the equivalent specific export 
tax rate is not equal to the specific import tariff rate, the Lerner Symmetry Theorem still holds 
 
6In a general equilibrium model, a specific tax cannot be expressed in nominal terms as this would imply 
that the real value of the tax would be affected by nominal prices so doubling nominal prices would halve the real 
value of the tax. Often, in the public economics literature, the untaxed good would be the numeraire good so the 
specific tax may seem to be expressed in nominal terms, but really it is expressed in terms of the untaxed good. 
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in the sense that a specific import tariff can be replaced by an equivalent specific export tax 
that results in the same relative domestic prices and the same welfare.7 The second point is that 
a specific import tariff is equivalent to an ad valorem import tariff in terms of their effects on 
relative domestic prices if 1 2 1 1p t p   or 1 1 1t    for country one, and if 2 1 2 2p t p   or 
2 2 2t    for country two. The third point is that a specific export tax is equivalent to an ad 
valorem export tax in terms of their effects on relative domestic prices if  1 1 1 1 21p e p    or 
 1 1 1 11e      for country one, and if  2 2 2 2 11p e p    or  2 2 2 21e      for country 
two. 
Under perfect competition, since firms and consumers are price takers, their behaviour 
is unaffected by whether countries use ad valorem trade taxes or equivalent specific trade taxes. 
Therefore, equating demand and supply in the world market for one of the goods, yields the 
equilibrium terms of trade of the two countries:  1 1 2,    and  2 1 2,   , as functions of the 
ad valorem trade taxes with specific trade taxes replaced by their ad valorem equivalent. 
Assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds then the terms of trade of a country is 
increasing in its own trade tax, 1 1 0     and 2 2 0    , and decreasing in the trade tax 
of the other country, 1 2 0     and 2 1 0    . It is also assumed that the Metzler (1949) 
paradox does not occur so that the relative domestic price of the importable good in a country 
is increasing in its own trade tax. For country one, this requires that    1 1 1 21 ,     is 
increasing in 1 , which requires that   1 1 1 11 0         and this implies that 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 0            . A similar analysis for country two shows that 
 
7 In the terminology of Costinot and Werning (2019), this shows the neutrality of a tax reform where a 
specific import tariff is replaced with an equivalent specific export tax. 
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 2 2 2 2 2 2 0            , and these two restrictions will be needed to sign some 
expressions later in the analysis. 
Having solved for the equilibrium terms of trade of the two countries as functions of 
the trade taxes, in principle, it is possible to solve for consumption of the two goods and hence 
the utility or welfare of the two countries as functions of the trade taxes. The welfare of country 
one is  1 1 2,W    and the welfare of country two is  2 1 2,W   , which are both assumed to be 
strictly quasi-concave in their own trade tax. Welfare under free trade of the two countries is 
obtained by setting all the trade taxes equal to zero,  1 1 0,0FW W  and  2 2 0,0FW W , and 
multilateral free trade is Pareto efficient for the world. In fact, any combination of trade taxes 
and subsidies such that   1 21 1 1     will equalise relative domestic prices in the two 
countries and yield Pareto efficiency. Although free trade is Pareto efficient for the world, a 
large country can improve its terms and increase its welfare by unilaterally introducing a small 
trade tax so  1 10,0 0W     and  2 20,0 0W    . Since the terms of trade of each country 
are worsened by the trade tax of the other country, the welfare of each country will be reduced 
by the trade tax of the other country, 1 2 0W     and 2 1 0W    , which is the negative 
terms of trade externality that results in the strategic interaction between the two countries. The 
trade taxes being strategic substitutes is commonly regarded as the central case according to 
Dixit (1987), and this would imply that 2 1 2 1 0W       and 2 2 1 2 0W      . Although, a 
priori, the possibility that trade taxes are sometimes strategic complements cannot be ruled out, 
and this would imply that 2 1 2 1 0W       and 2 2 1 2 0W      . For completeness, in the 
analysis that follows both possibilities will be considered. 
Before analysing the Nash equilibria in trade taxes, it is useful to consider the optimum 
trade tax when a country unilaterally intervenes while the other country pursues a policy of free 
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trade. If country one maximises its welfare while country two pursues a policy of free trade, 
then the first-order condition is: 
  *1 1
1
,0 0W 
   (2) 
This defines the optimum trade tax that is either an ad valorem import tariff or export 
tax *1 0  , or an equivalent specific import tariff  * * *1 1 1 1 ,0 0t     , or an equivalent 
specific export tax    * * * *1 1 1 1 1,0 1 0e       .8 At the optimum, regardless of the type of trade 
tax used, the welfare of country one is  * *1 1 1 ,0W W  , which is obviously higher than welfare 
under free trade, *1 1FW W . A similar analysis can be undertaken for country two, which would 
yield *2 0   and *2 2FW W . 
2.1 Nash Equilibria in Trade Taxes 
Now consider a trade war modelled as usual as the Nash equilibrium (NE) in ad valorem 
trade taxes (import tariffs or export taxes). In the NE, each country independently and 
simultaneously sets its trade tax to maximise its welfare given the trade tax set by the other 
country. Hence, assuming that there is an interior solution where trade occurs between the two 
countries, when both countries set ad valorem trade taxes, the first-order conditions for the NE 
in trade taxes are: 
    1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
, ,0 0W W    
     (3) 
 
8The optimum ad valorem import tariff (or export tax) can be derived in terms of the foreign export 
supply elasticity using offer curves, which was the approach used by Horwell (1966) and Lockwood and Wong 
(2000), but this will not be necessary for the analysis used in this paper. 
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The equation on the left implicitly defines the best-reply function of country one, 
 1 1 2 2,T   , and the equation on the right implicitly defines the best-reply function of 
country two,  2 2 1 1,T   , where 1T   and 2T   denote that both countries have chosen to use 
ad valorem trade taxes. The best-reply functions are both shown in figure 1, and the intersection 
of the two best-reply functions is the NE in ad valorem trade taxes, which is assumed to be 
unique.9 The welfare of each country is represented in figure 1 by the iso-welfare loci where 
 1 1 2,NW T T   and  2 1 2,NW T T   are the welfare of country one and country two, respectively, in 
the NE in ad valorem trade taxes. The shape of the iso-welfare loci for the two countries follows 
from the assumption that 1 2 0W     and 2 1 0W    . Figure 1 is drawn for the central case 
where both countries are worse off in the NE than under free trade, 1 1N FW W  and 2 2N FW W , 
but as Johnson (1953) showed it is possible that one country (but not both countries) can be 
better off in the NE than under free trade when there are asymmetries. Free trade is Pareto 
efficient as are all the combinations of trade taxes or subsidies on the locus where 
  1 21 1 1    . The optimum trade taxes of each country when the other country pursues a 
policy of free trade, *1  and *2 , are shown in figure 1 together with welfare of the countries 
with these optimum trade taxes, *1W  and *2W , where *1 1FW W  and *2 2FW W . 
In this NE in ad valorem trade taxes, each country is indifferent between using an ad 
valorem trade tax and an equivalent specific trade tax given the ad valorem trade tax set by the 
other country. However, as Horwell (1966) and Lockwood and Wong (2000) have shown the 
type of trade tax chosen by the other country affects the best-reply function of a country. Now 
consider the best-reply function of country one when country two uses a specific import tariff 
 
9 Strictly speaking, it is assumed that there is a unique interior NE where there is still trade between the 
two countries as Dixit (1987) showed that autarky is also a Nash equilibrium in trade taxes. 
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so now country one sets its trade tax optimally given that country two sets a specific tariff 2t . 
From (1) the specific import tariff 2t  is equivalent to an ad valorem trade tax 2  if 
 2 2 2 1 2,t     , which shows that the equivalent ad valorem trade tax of country two 
depends upon the ad valorem trade tax set by country one. Thus, when country two sets a 
specific import tariff, the constraint facing country one is different to when country two sets an 
ad valorem trade tax.10 Country one now maximises its welfare  1 1 2,W    subject to the 
constraint  2 2 2 1 2,t      and, using the implicit function theorem, the first order condition 
is: 
   2 2 11 1 2 21 2 1 1 2 2 2 20 where 0
W W d d
d d
   
       
           (4) 
Regarding the expression for the slope of the constraint, 2 1d d  , the denominator is 
positive given the assumption that rules out the Metzler paradox, and the numerator is negative 
since the tariff of country one has a negative effect on the terms of trade of country two. Since, 
it is assumed that 1 2 0W     then 1 1 0W     in (4), and quasi-concavity of the welfare 
function implies that the trade tax set by country one is higher when country two sets a specific 
import tariff. The situation is shown in figure 2 where the best-reply function of country one 
when country two uses an ad valorem trade tax is obtained by maximising welfare given the 
ad valorem trade tax of country two, so if 2 2  then the optimum is at   where 1 1  .11 
When country two uses a specific import tariff then country one maximises welfare subject to 
 
10In the same way that a duopolist faces a different constraint when its competitor sets output rather than 
price, and the approach used here will be similar to the method used by Vives (1985) to compare the Bertrand and 
Cournot equilibria in a differentiated products oligopoly model. 
11The figure is similar to that used by Cheng (1985) to compare the Bertrand and Cournot equilibria 
where he shows how to describe the Cournot equilibrium in the price space rather than the quantity space. 
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the constraint  2 2 2 1 2,t     , which from (4) is downward sloping and goes through   so 
 2 2 2 1 2,t       , so country one realises that when it increases its trade tax then there will be 
a decrease in the equivalent ad valorem trade tax of country two. Hence, the optimum is at   
where 1 2t   and 2 2t  , and this allows the best-reply function for country one when country 
two uses a specific import tariff,  1 2 2, tT  , to be derived.12 Country two switching from using 
an ad valorem trade tax to using a specific import tariff leads the best-reply function to swivel 
clockwise around  *1 ,0  and leads country one to set a higher trade tax. Although figure 2 is 
drawn for the case when trade taxes are strategic substitutes, the analysis is unchanged when 
trade taxes are strategic complements. A similar analysis can be used to derive the best-reply 
function of country two for the case when country one sets a specific import tariff  2 1 1, tT  . 
Now consider the best-reply function of country one when country two uses a specific 
export tax so country one sets its trade tax optimally given that country two sets a specific 
export tax 2e . From (1) the specific export tax 2e  is equivalent to an ad valorem trade tax 2  
if    2 2 2 1 2 2, 1e       , which acts as a constraint on country one when it sets its trade tax. 
Hence, country one maximises  1 1 2,W    subject to    2 2 2 1 2 2, 1e        and the first order 
condition is: 
     2 2 2 11 1 2 21 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10 and 01
W W d d
d d
    
        
              (5) 
 
12 The solution of the constrained maximisation problem would give the ad valorem trade taxes of the 
two countries as functions of the specific import tariff of country B, which would give a parametric representation 
of the best-reply function. 
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Regarding the expression for the slope of the constraint, 2 1d d  , the numerator is 
positive and the denominator is positive since the trade tax of country two has a positive effect 
on its terms of trade. Since, it is assumed that 1 2 0W     then 1 1 0W     in (5), quasi-
concavity of the welfare function implies that the trade tax set by country one is lower when 
country two sets a specific export tax. The situation is shown in figure 3 where the best-reply 
function for country one when country two uses an ad valorem trade tax  1 2 2,T    is the same 
as in figure 2. When country two uses a specific export tax then country one maximises its 
welfare subject to the constraint    2 2 2 1 2 2, 1e       , which is upward sloping in figure 3, 
and then the optimum is at   where 1 1e   and 2 2e  . Hence, the best-reply function for 
country one when country two uses a specific export tax,  1 2 2, eT  , can be derived. Country 
two switching from using an ad valorem trade tax to using a specific export tax leads the best-
reply function to swivel anti-clockwise around  *1 ,0  and leads country one to set a lower 
trade tax. Although figure 3 is drawn for the case when trade taxes are strategic substitutes, the 
analysis is unchanged when trade taxes are strategic complements. A similar analysis can be 
used to derive the best-reply function of country two for the case when country one uses a 
specific export tax  2 1 1, eT  . 
The best-reply functions for both countries for all three types of trade tax are shown in 
figure 4 for the case of strategic substitutes and in figure 5 for the case of strategic 
complements. The three best-reply functions of country one intersect the three best-reply 
functions of country two nine times and are labelled from i to ix. In a static one-stage game 
where both countries independently and simultaneously choose the type of trade tax and the 
trade tax rate then all nine intersections are NE. Assuming that the countries are symmetric and 
use the same type of trade tax,  1 2,z z zT T T  where , ,z t e , then the NE will be symmetric 
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so      1 2N z N z N zT T T     and      1 2N z N z N zW T W T W T  . Then, comparing the Nash 
equilibria, the NE trade taxes are lowest when both countries use specific export taxes and 
highest when both countries use specific import tariffs,      N e N N tT T T    . If 
1 2 0      then the welfare of both countries is decreasing in the trade tax, 0jW     
for 1,2j  . Hence, the NE welfare is highest when both countries use specific export taxes 
and lowest when both countries use specific import tariffs,      N e N N tW T W T W T  .This 
leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: In the NE in trade taxes when countries are symmetric and both countries 
choose to use the same type of trade tax, the NE trade taxes are lower and the NE welfare is 
higher when countries use specific export taxes than when they use specific import tariffs, 
     N e N N tT T T     and      N e N N tW T W T W T  . 
In a trade war, specific import tariffs are not equivalent to specific export taxes as the 
outcome in terms of trade tax rates and welfare is different. Although each country is indifferent 
between using a specific import tariff and a specific export tax given its conjecture about the 
trade tax of the other country, as implied by the Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem, the type of 
trade tax chosen by a country affects the best-reply function of the other country. When both 
countries choose to use specific import tariffs, both countries become more aggressive as the 
best-reply functions of both countries move outwards and the NE trade taxes are higher 
(compared to when they choose to use ad valorem trade taxes). Whereas, when both countries 
choose to use specific export taxes, both countries become less aggressive as their best-reply 
functions shift inwards and the NE trade taxes are lower (compared to when they choose to use 
ad valorem trade taxes). As a result of the lower trade taxes, the welfare of both countries is 
higher when they both choose to use specific export taxes rather than specific import tariffs. 
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The type of trade tax chosen by the two countries affects the outcome of the trade war, and 
specific export taxes are not equivalent to specific import tariffs, which shows that the Lerner 
Symmetry Theorem does not hold for specific trade taxes in a trade war. 
In the symmetric case, although there are multiple NE, it seems reasonable to suggest 
that both countries will choose to use specific export taxes since this NE Pareto-dominates the 
other symmetric NE where both countries choose to use the same type of trade tax. However, 
changing the structure of the game between the two countries to a two-stage game will ensure 
that there is a unique outcome. 
2.2 Trade Policy Game 
Consider the two-stage trade policy game where each country independently and 
simultaneously chooses the type of trade tax (ad valorem trade tax, jT  ; specific import tariff, 
t
jT ; or specific export tax, ejT , where 1,2j  ) to use at stage one and then sets the ad valorem 
equivalent trade tax rate j  at stage two. The nine possible NE of the second stage of the game 
are shown in figure 4 for the case of strategic substitutes and in figure 5 for the case of strategic 
complements, which depend upon the type of trade tax chosen by the two countries in the first 
stage. In the first stage, if country two chooses to use a specific import tariff then the best-reply 
function of country one will be  1 2 2, tT   and the NE will be iv if country one chooses to use 
a specific import tariff, v if it chooses to use an ad valorem trade tax, and vi if it chooses to use 
a specific export tax. Country one will choose a specific export tax since the NE vi gives it a 
higher level of welfare since the trade tax set by country two is lower than in iv or v. A similar 
argument can be used to show that country one will choose to use a specific export tax if 
country two chooses to use an ad valorem trade tax or a specific export tax. Hence, choosing 
to use a specific export tax is a dominant strategy for country one, and by the same argument 
it is a dominant strategy for country two. Therefore, the subgame-perfect NE of this two-stage 
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trade policy game is for both countries to choose to use specific export taxes and for the 
outcome to be given by ix in figure 4 and figure 5. In the symmetric case, as shown in 
Proposition 1, both countries are better off choosing to use specific export taxes rather than ad 
valorem trade taxes or specific import tariffs. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: In the subgame-perfect NE of the two-stage trade policy game, both countries 
choose to use specific export taxes. In the symmetric case, both countries are better off than 
when they both choose to use specific import tariffs or ad valorem trade taxes. 
For each country, choosing to use a specific import tariff makes the other country more 
aggressive as its best-reply function shifts outwards whereas choosing to use a specific export 
tax makes the other country less aggressive as its best-reply function shifts inwards. A country 
choosing to use a specific export tax makes the other country set a lower trade tax in the second 
stage whatever type of trade tax the other country has chosen in the first stage. Therefore, 
choosing to use a specific export tax is a dominant strategy for both countries that results in 
lower NE trade taxes and higher welfare for both countries. 
2.3 Sustaining Free Trade in an Infinitely-Repeated Game 
A trade war will reduce world welfare compared to free trade and, in the symmetric 
case, it will reduce the welfare of both countries. The situation is a prisoners’ dilemma since 
both countries use trade taxes in the NE, but both countries are better off under free trade. As 
is well known, this prisoners’ dilemma can be avoided in an infinitely-repeated game where 
co-operation (free trade) can be sustained by the use of Nash-reversion trigger strategies.13 In 
fact, as Grossman (2016) points out any formal trade agreement can only achieve those 
outcomes that are sustainable in an infinitely-repeated game. Suppose that the static trade 
 
13The use of Nash-reversion trigger strategies to sustain co-operation in infinitely-repeated games was 
demonstrated by Friedman (1971), and Dixit (1987) provides an application to sustaining free trade. 
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policy game is repeated infinitely with the countries choosing the type of trade tax to use at the 
beginning of the game. With Nash-reversion trigger strategies, each country sets a zero trade 
tax as long as the other country does the same, but if a country deviates then the two countries 
revert to the NE in trade taxes forever afterwards. Then, if the discount factor is  0,1  , free 
trade can be sustained if the present discounted value of welfare from free trade exceeds the 
present discounted value of welfare from deviation followed by the welfare in the NE forever 
afterwards. Assuming symmetry so that welfare under free trade is the same for both countries, 
1 2
F F FW W W  , which obviously does not depend upon the type of trade taxes chosen by the 
two countries. If a country deviates from free trade then its sets its optimum trade tax while the 
other country sets a zero trade tax as in (2), and its welfare is * * *1 2W W W  , which again does 
not depend upon the type of trade taxes chosen by the two countries. In the trade war that 
follows any deviation, countries will receive the NE welfare, which does depend upon the type 
of trade taxes chosen by the two countries. There are multiple Nash equilibria so to limit the 
number of cases considered only the symmetric NE, where both countries use the same type of 
trade taxes, will be analysed so NE welfare is  N zW T , where , ,z t e . Hence, when the two 
countries are symmetric, free trade can be sustained in the infinitely-repeated game using Nash-
reversion trigger strategies if: 
  *1 , ,1 1F N zW W W T z t e       (6) 
Free trade is sustainable if the discount rate is greater than the critical value obtained 
by making the above expression an equality and solving for the discount factor, which depends 
upon the type of trade taxes chosen by the two countries: 
    
*
* , ,
F
z
N N z
W WT z t e
W W T
      (7) 
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Clearly, the lower the welfare in the NE in trade taxes then the lower is the critical 
discount factor and the easier it is to sustain free trade. From above, welfare is higher when 
both countries use specific export taxes than when they use ad valorem trade taxes and this is 
higher than when they both use specific import tariffs,      N e N N tW T W T W T  . Hence, 
the ranking of critical discount factors is:      e tN N NT T T    , so it is easier to sustain 
free trade when both countries threaten to use specific import tariffs than when they both 
threaten to use ad valorem trade taxes or specific export taxes. 
Proposition 3: In the NE in trade taxes when countries are symmetric, the critical discount 
factors when using Nash-reversion trigger strategies are such that:      t eT T T    . 
It is easier to sustain co-operation (free trade) using Nash-reversion trigger strategies, 
the more severe is the punishment for deviation, which is the NE welfare. Since welfare in the 
NE is lowest when both countries choose to use specific import tariffs, it is easier to sustain 
free trade in this case. Hence, if the objective is to sustain free trade, the ranking of trade tax 
types is reversed in this infinitely-repeated game compared to the static game, but once again 
specific export taxes are not equivalent to specific import tariffs. 
3. Multi-Country Trade Policy Game 
The analysis can be extended to the case of many countries and many goods under the 
assumption that the countries are symmetric using a model loosely based upon Bond and 
Syropoulos (1996). To maintain symmetry, the analysis will be restricted to comparing the 
Nash equilibria where all countries use the same type of trade tax. The J  countries and the J  
goods are labelled 1, ,j J  , where 2J  , and the world price of the jth good is jp . It is 
assumed that the jth country has a comparative advantage in the jth good so it exports this good 
and imports all the other goods. First, each country has to choose whether to use an ad valorem 
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trade tax, which can be either an import tariff or an export tax, and is denoted by jT  ; a specific 
import tariff, which is denoted by tjT ; or a specific export tax, which is denoted by ejT , where 
1, ,j J   denotes the country. Then, each country, 1, ,j J  , has to decide the rate for the 
chosen trade tax with the ad valorem trade tax rate denoted by j , the (average) specific import 
tariff rate denoted by jt , and the specific export tax rate denoted by je . The specific import 
tariff is expressed in terms of the export good and the specific export tax is expressed in terms 
of a bundle of the imported goods. 
The domestic price of the jth good in the hth country is jhp  so the domestic price of the 
jth good relative to the price of the export good (the hth good) in the hth country in terms of 
the trade taxes and the world prices is: 
   
1 , , 1,1
jh j h jh h
hh h h h h
p p t p
j h j h J
p p e p

 
       (8) 
where jht  is the specific tariff imposed on the jth good by the hth country and
 1h jj ip p J    is the average price of the imported goods since the specific export tax 
is expressed in terms of a bundle of imports. For the jth good, an imported good, a specific 
import tariff jht  is equivalent to an ad valorem import tariff h  if h j jh hp t p  . Then, summing 
over all the imported goods yields that h h h hp t p    or h h ht   , where h jhj ht t  is the 
average specific tariff and h h hp p   is the terms of trade of the hth country (the price of its 
exported good divided by the average price of its imported goods). In any symmetric 
equilibrium, the price of all imported goods will be the same and hence the specific import 
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tariff will be same for all imported goods, jh ht t  for all j h .14 A specific export tax is 
equivalent to an ad valorem export tax if  1h h h h hp e p     or  1h h h he     . 
The equilibrium terms of trade of the hth country is  h τ  where  1 2, , , J  τ   is 
the vector of ad valorem trade taxes and, as usual, it is assumed that the terms of trade are 
increasing in a country’s own trade tax, 0h h    . It is also assumed that the terms of trade 
are decreasing in the trade taxes of all the other countries, 0h j     with j h , which 
implies a negative terms of trade externality. As in the two-country model, the possibility of 
the Metzler paradox will be ruled out, which implies that   0h h h h h h            . 
Furthermore, another useful result can be obtained from symmetry and the definition of the 
terms of trade, which implies that: 
 1 1
J
jj h
h h
p J
p


    (9) 
Then, summing the reciprocal of (9) over all the countries yields: 
 1 11
J h
h
hJ

    (10) 
Differentiating with respect to the trade tax of the jth country and imposing symmetry 
yields: 
  1 , 1, ,j h
j j
J h j h j J
 
 
         (11) 
 
14 Technically, when a country chooses to use specific import tariffs then its strategic variable is the 
average specific tariff. In any deviation from a symmetric equilibrium, the country sets the average specific tariff 
and the individual specific tariffs are adjusted so that the equivalent ad valorem tariff rate is the same for all 
imported goods. 
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The welfare of the jth country is  jW τ , which is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave 
in its own trade tax and decreasing in the trade taxes of all the other countries, 0j hW     
for h j , due to the negative terms of trade externality. Since all countries are large, they have 
a unilateral incentive to use a trade tax if all other countries are pursuing a policy of free trade, 
  0j jW   0 . If all countries set a common trade tax, j    for all j , then the welfare of 
the jth country is a function of this common trade tax:    j jW W  τ    where  , , ,  τ    , 
which is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave in  . Since free trade is Pareto-efficient, the 
welfare of every country,  jW    is maximised when 0   and strict quasi-concavity implies 
that welfare is decreasing in the common trade tax, 0W      for all 0  . 
When all countries use ad valorem trade taxes,  1 2, , , JT T T T     , the first-order 
conditions for the symmetric (interior) Nash equilibrium, which is assumed to be unique, are: 
    0 1, ,Nj
j
W T
j J


  
τ
  (12) 
where         1 2, ,N N N NJT T T T     τ   is the vector of NE trade taxes when all 
countries use ad valorem trade taxes with      N N Nj hT T T       for , 1, ,j h J  . 
When all countries use specific import tariffs,  1 2, , ,t t t tJT T T T  , each country 
maximises its welfare given the specific import tariffs set by the other 1J   countries. In the 
symmetric NE, the jth country sets j  to maximise its welfare  jW τ  subject to the 1J   
constraints that  h h ht   τ  where h it t  for all ,h i j . Hence, the first-order condition for 
the jth country is: 
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 0j j h
h jj h j
W W d
d

  
     (13) 
Totally differentiating the constraint  h h ht   τ  then imposing symmetry, i hd d   
for all ,h i j , and using (11) yields: 
       
1 01
h h jh
j h h h h
Jd
d J
  
    
        (14) 
The numerator is negative due to the negative terms of trade externality and the 
denominator is positive as the Metzler paradox is ruled out. Note that if there are two countries, 
2J  , then this derivative is the same as in (4). Since the derivative (14) is negative and there 
is a negative terms of trade externality, 0h jW    ,   N tj jW T  τ  is negative in the 
symmetric NE where      N t N t N tj hT T T     for all ,j h . Since there is assumed to be a 
unique symmetric NE and   0j jW   0 ,    0j jW    τ  if the common trade tax 
   N T   . Hence,   N tj jW T  τ  being negative implies that the NE trade taxes are 
higher when all countries use specific import tariffs than when all countries use ad valorem 
trade taxes,    N t NT T   . Since welfare is decreasing in the common trade tax, 
0jW     , the welfare of all countries is lower with a specific import tariff than with an ad 
valorem trade tax,          N t N t N Nj jW T W T W T W T      . 
When all countries use specific export taxes,  1 2, , ,e e e eJT T T T  , each country 
maximises its welfare given the specific export taxes set by the other 1J   countries where 
h ie e  for all ,h i j  in the symmetric NE. The jth country sets j  to maximise its welfare 
22 
 jW τ  subject to the 1J   constraints that    1h h h he    τ  for all ,h i j . Hence, the 
first-order condition for the jth country is: 
 0j j h
h jj h j
W W d
d

  
     (15) 
Totally differentiating the constraint    1h h h he    τ  then imposing symmetry, 
i hd d   for all ,h i j , and using (11) yields: 
        
1 1 01 1
h h h jh
j h h h h h
Jd
d J
   
     
           (16) 
The numerator is positive due to the negative terms of trade externality and the 
denominator is clearly positive. Note that if there are two countries, 2J  , then this derivative 
is the same as in (5). Since the derivative (16) is positive and there is a negative terms of trade 
externality, 0h jW    ,   N ej jW T  τ  is positive in the symmetric NE in trade taxes 
where      N e N e N ej hT T T     for all ,j h . Since there is assumed to be a unique 
symmetric NE and   0j jW   0 ,    0j jW    τ  if the common trade tax 
   N T   . Hence,   N ej jW T  τ  being positive implies that the NE trade taxes are 
lower when all countries use specific export taxes than when all countries use ad valorem trade 
taxes,    N e NT T   . Since welfare is decreasing in a common trade tax, 0jW     , the 
welfare of all countries is higher with specific export taxes than with an ad valorem trade taxes, 
         N e N e N Nj jW T W T W T W T      . This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 4: In the NE in trade taxes when countries are symmetric and all countries choose 
to use the same type of trade tax, the NE trade taxes are lower and the NE welfare is higher 
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when countries use specific export taxes than when they use specific import tariffs, 
     N e N N tT T T     and      N e N N tW T W T W T  . 
As in the case of two countries, a specific export tax is not equivalent to a specific 
import tariff in a trade war as the outcome is different in terms of the level of trade taxes and 
welfare. Hence, again the Lerner Symmetry Theorem does not hold for specific trade taxes in 
a trade war. It would be straightforward to use Proposition 4 to extend Proposition 3 to the case 
of many countries. 
4. Trade Policy Game with Positive Terms of Trade Externalities 
Until now it has been assumed that there is a negative terms of trade externality, but 
there may be a positive terms of trade externality when some countries export or import the 
same good as in Panagariya and Schiff (1994, 1995) and Zissimos (2009). In this perfectly 
competitive model, there are three countries, one, two, and three, and two goods, one and two, 
where country one and two both export good one to country three and import good two from 
country three. Hence, the terms of trade for both country one and two are: 1 2p p  , where 
1p  and 2p  are the world prices of goods one and two, respectively. The analysis will only 
consider the trade policies of countries one and two with country three assumed to be passively 
pursuing a policy of free trade. First, countries one and two each have to choose whether to use 
an ad valorem trade tax, which is denoted by jT  ; a specific import tariff, which is denoted by 
t
jT ; or a specific export tax, which is denoted by ejT . Then, each country, 1, 2j  , has to set 
the rate for the chosen type of trade tax with the ad valorem trade tax rate denoted by j , the 
specific import tariff rate denoted by jt , and the specific export tax denoted by je . The 
domestic prices of goods one and two, respectively, are 1 jp  and 2 jp  for 1, 2j  , and the 
relative domestic price of the importable good in terms of the world prices and trade taxes is: 
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A specific import tariff is equivalent to an ad valorem import tariff if 1 2j jt p p  or 
j jt   , and a specific export tax is equivalent to an ad valorem export tax if 
 2 1 1j j je p p    or  1j j je      for 1,2j  . Equating demand and supply in the world 
market would yield the equilibrium terms of trade for countries one and two,  1 2,   , as a 
function of the ad valorem trade taxes of the two countries, and where 0j     as an 
increase in either trade tax will improve the terms of trade of both countries so there is a positive 
terms of trade externality. The welfare of the two countries can be written as a function of the 
ad valorem trade taxes of the two countries,  1 2,jW   , where it is assumed that jW  is strictly 
quasi-concave in j , and that 0j hW     due to the positive terms of trade externality, where 
h j  and , 1,2j h  . 
Now consider the NE in ad valorem trade taxes (import tariffs or export taxes) of the 
trade policy game between country one and country two. Assuming that there is an interior 
solution, the first-order conditions for the NE in trade taxes are: 
    1 1 2 2 1 2
1 2
, ,0 0W W    
     (18) 
The equation on the left implicitly defines the best-reply function of country one, 
 1 1 2 2,T    , and the equation on the right implicitly defines the best-reply function of 
country two,  2 2 1 1,T    . The best-reply functions are shown in figure 6, and the 
intersection of the two best-reply functions is the NE in ad valorem trade taxes, which is 
assumed to be unique. The welfare of each country is represented by the iso-welfare loci where 
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 1 1 2,NW T T   and  2 1 2,NW T T   are the welfare of country one and two, respectively, in the NE. 
The shape of the iso-welfare loci follows from the assumption that there is a positive terms of 
trade externality, 1 2 0W     and 2 1 0W    , since the slope of the iso-welfare loci of 
country one is    2 1 1 1 1 2d d W W         . The best-reply functions are drawn under 
the assumption that trade taxes are strategic complements as this is regarded as the central case 
when there is a positive terms of trade externality, but this is not important for the current 
analysis. The optimum trade taxes when one country unilaterally deviates from free trade are: 
 *1 1 20,T    and  *2 2 10,T   . The aggregate welfare of the two countries (but not the world 
due to the presence of the third country) is maximised at C, which is on the diagonal in the 
symmetric case shown in figure 6. This implies that welfare of the two countries in the 
symmetric case is increasing along the diagonal from the origin 0 to C. 
Now consider the best-reply function of country one when country two chooses to use 
a specific import tariff, 2tT . From (17), a specific import tariff 2t  is equivalent to an ad valorem 
trade tax 2  if  2 2 1 2,t     , which shows that the equivalent ad valorem trade tax of 
country two depends upon the trade tax set by country one. Country one now maximises its 
welfare  1 1 2,W    subject to the constraint  2 2 1 2,t     , which yields the first-order 
condition: 
   2 11 1 2 21 2 1 1 2 20 where 0
W W d d
d d
   
       
           (19) 
The denominator of the derivative is positive given the assumption that rules out the 
Metzler paradox, and the numerator is positive since the tariff of country one has a positive 
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effect on the terms of trade of both countries.15 Since it is assumed that 1 2 0W     then 
1 1 0W     in (19) so strict quasi-concavity of the welfare function implies that the tariff set 
by country one is higher when country two uses a specific import tariff. The situation is shown 
in figure 7 where the best-reply function of country one when country two uses an ad valorem 
trade tax is obtained by maximising welfare given the ad valorem trade tax of country two so 
if 2 2   then the optimum is at   where 1 1  . When country two uses a specific import 
tariff then country one maximises welfare subject to the constraint  2 2 1 2,t     , which 
from (19) is upward sloping in figure 7 so country one realises that when it increases its trade 
tax then there will be an increase in the equivalent ad valorem trade tax of country two. Hence, 
the optimum is at   where 1 1t   and 2 2t  , and this allows the best-reply function of 
country one when country two uses a specific import tariff  1 2 2, tT   to be derived. Country 
two switching from using an ad valorem trade tax to using a specific import tariff leads the 
best-reply function to swivel clockwise around  *1 ,0 , and leads country one to set a higher 
trade tax. Although figure 7 is drawn for the case when trade taxes are strategic complements, 
the analysis is unchanged when trade taxes are strategic substitutes. A similar analysis can be 
used to derive the best-reply function of country two for the case when country one uses a 
specific import tariff  2 1 1, tT  . 
Now consider the best-reply function of country one when country two uses a specific 
export tax, 2eT . From (17) a specific export tax 2e  is equivalent to an ad valorem trade tax 2  
if    2 2 1 2 2, 1e       , which acts as a constraint when country one sets its trade tax. 
 
15 For later reference, see footnote 16, it is assumed that the Metzler paradox does not hold in a 
hypothetical situation (customs union) where both countries simultaneously increase their import tariffs. This 
implies that the derivative in (19) is less than one. 
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Hence, country one maximises its welfare  1 1 2,W    subject to    2 2 1 2 2, 1e        and the 
first order condition is: 
     2 2 11 1 2 21 2 1 2 2 2 2
10 and 01
W W d d
d d
    
        
              (20) 
The denominator of the derivative is clearly positive as 2 0    , and the numerator 
is clearly negative as 1 0    . Since it is assumed that 1 2 0W     then 1 1 0W     in 
(20) so quasi-concavity of the welfare function implies that the trade tax set by country one is 
lower when country two sets a specific export tax. The situation is shown in figure 8 where the 
best-reply function for country one when country two uses an ad valorem trade tax  1 2 2,T    
is the same as in figure 7.When country two uses a specific export tax then country one 
maximises its welfare subject to the constraint    2 2 1 2 2, 1e       , which is downward 
sloping in figure 8, and the optimum is at   where 1 1e   and 2 2e  . Hence, the best-reply 
function of country one when country two uses a specific export tax  1 2 2, eT   can be derived. 
Country two switching from using an ad valorem trade tax to using a specific export tax leads 
the best-reply function to swivel anti-clockwise around  *1 ,0  and leads country one to set a 
lower trade tax. Although figure 8 is drawn for the case when trade taxes are strategic 
complements, the analysis is unchanged for the case of strategic substitutes. A similar analysis 
can be used to derive the best-reply function for country two when country one uses a specific 
export tax  2 1 1, eT  . 
The best-reply functions of both countries and for all three types of trade taxes are 
shown in figure 9 for the case of strategic complements. The three best-reply functions of 
country one intersect the three best-reply functions of country two nine times and the 
intersections are labelled from i to ix. In a static one-stage game where both countries 
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independently and simultaneously choose the type of trade tax and the trade tax rate then all 
nine intersections are NE. Assuming that the countries are symmetric and that both countries 
use the same type of trade tax,  1 2,z z zT T T  where , ,z t e , then the NE will be symmetric 
with the NE trade taxes:      1 2N z N z N zT T T     and the NE welfare
     1 2N z N z N zW T W T W T  . Then comparing the symmetric NE, the NE trade taxes are 
lowest when both countries use specific export taxes and highest when both countries use 
specific import tariffs, and the NE welfare is lowest when both countries use specific export 
taxes and highest when both countries use specific import tariffs.16 This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 5: In the NE in trade taxes when countries are symmetric and both countries 
choose to use the same type of trade tax, the NE trade taxes are higher and the NE welfare is 
higher when countries use specific import tariffs than when they use specific export taxes, 
     N e N N tT T T     and      N t N N eW T W T W T  . 
As in the case of negative terms of trade externalities, a specific export tax is not 
equivalent to a specific import tariff in a trade war as the outcome is different in terms of the 
trade tax rates and welfare of the countries. 
The analysis can be extended as in section 2.2 for the case of a two-stage game where 
countries first choose the type of trade tax and then choose the trade tax rates. It can be shown 
that choosing to use a specific import tariff is a dominant strategy for both countries. Similarly, 
the analysis can be extended as in section 2.3 to consider co-operation in an infinitely-repeated 
game. In this case co-operation between the two countries would be at C in figure 6 rather than 
 
16 Note that the slope of the constraint (19) being less than one implies that the NE with specific import 
tariffs, iv in figure 9, is closer to the origin than the co-operative outcome C in figure 6. 
29 
free trade. It can be shown that it is easier to sustain co-operation if both countries threaten to 
use specific export taxes. 
5. Conclusions 
The most significant result of this paper is that the Lerner Symmetry Theorem does not 
hold for specific trade taxes in trade policy games such as trade wars. The result has been 
obtained in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium model using a general analysis that 
avoids unnecessary complexity by starting from welfare and the terms of trade as functions of 
the equivalent ad valorem trade taxes. This yields general results that depend only upon the 
sign of the terms of trade externality, and perhaps surprisingly do not depend upon whether 
trade taxes are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When there is a negative terms 
of trade externality as in the standard two-country model of trade policy games, choosing to 
use specific export taxes is a dominant strategy for all countries. In the symmetric case, all 
countries will set lower trade taxes and have higher welfare if they choose to use specific export 
taxes rather than specific import tariffs or ad valorem trade taxes. When there is a positive 
terms of trade externality as when two countries export the same good, choosing to use specific 
import tariffs is a dominant strategy for these two countries. 
When the objective is to sustain free trade in an infinitely-repeated game with a negative 
terms of trade externality, the discount factor is lowest and hence it is easiest to sustain free 
trade when countries threaten to use specific import tariffs rather than specific export taxes or 
ad valorem trade taxes. This is because specific import tariffs yield the worst outcome in terms 
of NE welfare and so they are better at deterring deviation from free trade. 
Hence, in all the trade policy games analysed, it has been shown that the Lerner 
Symmetry Theorem does not hold and that a specific trade tax (an import tariff or an export 
tax depending upon the game) is superior to an ad valorem trade tax. Clearly, this is a 
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significant result for the analysis of trade policy games where trade taxes have usually been 
assumed to be ad valorem. 
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0
2

2

 1 1 2,W  
Iso-Welfare
Loci
2
e
1
1
e



1
2
 1 2 2, tT  1 2 2,T   1 2 2,
e
T 
 2 1 1, eT 
 2 1 1,T  
 2 1 1, tT 
Figure 4: Trade Taxes vs Specific Trade Taxes:Ad Valorem
Strategic Substitutes
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
1
i
W
1
ii
W
1
iii
W
1 1 1
Iso-Welfare Loci
i ii iii
W W W 
2
ii
W
0
1
2
 1 2 2, tT  1 2 2,T   1 2 2,
e
T 
 2 1 1, eT 
 2 1 1,T  
 2 1 1, tT 
Figure 5: Trade Taxes vs Specific Trade Taxes:Ad Valorem
Strategic Complements
i
ii
iii
iv
v
vi
vii
viii
ix
1
i
W
1
ii
W
1
iii
W
1 1 1
Iso-Welfare Loci
i ii iii
W W W 
2
ii
W
0
1
2
0
NE
C
 1 2 2,T  
 2 1 1,T  
 1 1 2,NW T T 
 2 1 2,NW T T 
1
C
W
2
C
W
Figure 6: Nash Equilibrium in Trade Taxes with PositiveAd Valorem
Terms of Trade Externalities
*
1
*
2
1
*
1
2
 1 2 2,T    1 2 2, tT 
 
2
2
1 2,
t

  

Figure 7: Best Reply for Country One to a Specific Import Tariff
with a Positive Terms of Trade Externality
0
2
 2

 1 1 2,W  
Iso-Welfare
Loci
2
t
1

1
t

	
1*
1
2
 1 2 2,T   1 2 2,
e
T 
 2 1 2
2
2
,
1
e
   



Figure 8: Best Reply for Country One to a Specific Export Tax
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